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18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : The 8 February Report of the OAS

Special Consulting Commission on

Security

l. The report addresses itself to defining methods by which Castro-Communist subversion is spread in the hemisphere without citing specific examples of countries affected. The report also includes certain general recommendations for the control of subversive activities.

It is stated in the introduction to the report that the official information placed at the Commission's disposal was very general in nature and was provided by only five nations. Therefore, the Commission used "information from other sources."

2. The first main section of the report is devoted to a discussion of Cuba as a base of subversion in Latin America. It describes how training facilities in Cuba as well as Cuban domestic organizations and sponsorship of international meetings and congresses of all types are used to subvert Latin Americans who travel to Cuba.

The report points out in this connection that controls ever travel to and from Cuba have become a major problem. Recommendations to help meet this problem include: requiring each person crossing any international frontier to have proper documentation; formally forbidding all travel to Cuba except for valid reasons; providing hemisphere travel authorities with master lists of suspected and known Communist agents; and providing for close inter-governmental cooperation to maintain stiff travel controls.

3. The report then indicates the importance and the wide variety of forms taken by Castro-Communist propaganda efforts in the hemisphere as a means of winning new converts.

The jamming of propaganda broadcasts by Radio Havana is discarded as a largely ineffective and too expensive means of combatting the problem.

Recommendations on how to control the influence of Communist propaganda include: each Latin American country should organize the entities necessary to issue counterpropaganda or which could otherwise negate such propaganda; each hemisphere country should place the same limitations on Bloc and Cuban missions within its borders that are placed on its missions by the Communist countries; reduce wherever possible all contacts with Cuban and Bloc propaganda media and impose tight controls on local propaganda outlets.

4. Financing of subversive activities from Cuba or international Communism is obvious and necessary But difficult to prove.

In addition to local fund-raising activities, Communists and other subversive agents in Latin America rely heavily on transfers of funds effected directly from Cuban and Bloc representatives. The sale of contraband-especially narcotics--is an increasingly important source of funds for these elements.

Eliminating or reducing the funding of subversive activities should be achieved by: inspecting the financial affairs of local Communists and their front organizations; controlling contraband; and controlling internal Communist fund-raising activities.

5. General recommendations to curb the spread of Castro-Communist subversion in the hemisphere are made.

The report agrees to "recommend to the American governments that they pay special attention to their intelligence services," and that national security forces be bolstered to meet the Communist threat.

A special hemisphere conference of security and intelligence leaders should be held.

The Special Consulting Commission of Security should be furnished with all information on such subversion which can be found by the OAS member countries.

A final, special recommendation states that in view of the gravity of the current threat emanating from Cuba, the threat "can only be adequately and efficiently attended to through the adoption of the measures provided for" in the Inter-American Treaty for Mutual Assistance Approved For Research 1008: CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020010-3